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Aruna looked so small and thin that I guessed he was eight years old.
His mother, Hawa,' whose T-shirt was pulled down to nurse a baby cov-
ered in boils, corrected my unspoken guess by informing us2 that Aruna
was thirteen. Hawa explained that after neglecting Aruna his entire life
by refusing to provide any resources for his sustenance, the boy's natural
father and her first husband, John, was demanding his return. Hawa did
* J.D. May 2007, University of Michigan. I am indebted to Simeon Koroma and
Vivek Maru, the co-founders and co-directors of Timap for Justice, for their guidance and
teaching about justice in rural Sierra Leone. Thanks especially to Vivek and Professor A.W.
Brian Simpson of University of Michigan Law School for their helpful comments on early drafts
of this work. I worked for Timap for Justice in Sierra Leone from late May to early August of
2005 as a legal intern. The University of Michigan's Student Funded Fellowships provided the
funds that made this internship possible. Timap means "stand up" in Krio, a Sierra Leonean
language. For more information on the organization, visit http://www.timapforjustice.org/.
I. All names have been changed but the individuals' stories are reproduced faithfully
from fieldwork notes.
2. I accompanied Sierra Leonean paralegals in their work. They are trained and em-
ployed by Timap for Justice. They are educated and, usually, long-term members of the
community where they are based.
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not want to let her son go easily; she preferred that Aruna remain with
her or go to Freetown, the capital, to learn carpentry from her brother.
She explained that during the war,3 when Aruna was just a toddler, they
were destitute, hiding in the bush to escape the rebels. She pleaded with
John for some money or food for their son, but he refused. Recently,
though, he had expressed an interest in the boy.
A year before, when Hawa gave in to her ex-husband's demand for
Aruna, John treated him so badly that Aruna kept running home to
Hawa. John sent Aruna into the fields to chase birds off the rice rather
than letting him continue in school, and John did not feed or clothe
Aruna properly. Aruna was silent as Hawa spoke agitatedly, and Hawa's
elderly father corroborated his daughter's tale. We were told that Hawa's
current husband treated Aruna well.
In accordance with our dispute resolution strategy of mediation, we
then heard from John, who spoke loudly and emphatically. He stated that
he was the father and the boy belonged with him. Whatever he wanted to
do with Aruna was his choice. In fact, this was generally true: under cus-
tomary law' in rural Sierra Leone, when parents separate, the young
children are usually allowed to stay with their mother until school-age,
or about seven, but they are then turned over to the father and his family.
If the father asserts his parental rights, however, he is often awarded cus-
tody of the children regardless of their age by the local chief who
adjudicates the dispute.6
With John in our office for the second mediation on this case, we
called in reinforcements. For the Mende people in Sierra Leone, a sa-
babu, or "matchmaker," often arranges marriages and under customary
law has ongoing responsibilities to the couple, their respective families,
and any offspring, even after a separation. The sababu for Hawa and
John's union had agreed to be present but instead sent a representative,
who listened briefly and then declared that the boy needed to be returned
3. The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002.
4. "Rebels" refers to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the armed group that
overran most of Sierra Leone and terrorized the population by murdering, raping, and maim-
ing people and burning villages.
5. The customary legal system in Africa is not customary international law. For gen-
eral background on customary law in Africa see T.W. BENNETT, A SOURCEBOOK FOR AFRICAN
CUSTOMARY LAW FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (1991) [hereinafter BENNETT, SOURCEBOOK]; T.W.
BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (2004) [hereinafter BENNETT, CUSTOMARY
LAW].
6. For almost twenty-five years, there has been no book published on customary fam-
ily law in Sierra Leone. As a result, much of my research and the resulting conclusions are
based on conversations with local elders, including chiefs, local court officers, and Timap for
Justice staff members raised under customary law. I recognize that my presence as a foreigner
could have an influence on the mediations I witnessed, but that bias is difficult to measure.
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to his father's custody. Aruna was no longer a young child. Such was the
tradition.
Hawa, the paralegals, and I were dissatisfied with this solution; it did
not result from a mediation in which both sides were fully heard. The
paralegals and Hawa felt the sababu himself needed to become involved
in a just solution in this case. After further communication, the sababu
arrived and listened carefully to both sides. He asked Hawa what support
John had provided to the child, what was Aruna's condition, and what
had happened when John had previously had custody of Aruna. He also
permitted John to ask his son questions. I listened anxiously to the trans-
lations, and my head swung quickly when I heard the sababu say the
phrase "human rights." '7 He said, "we have human rights in this country
now; we need to ask the boy what he wants. 8 He then asked Aruna
whether he was happy at home, whether John treated him well, why he
ran away repeatedly when in his father's custody, and whether Aruna
wanted to stay with his maternal uncle in Freetown to learn carpentry.
Aruna's answers were brief but certain: his natural father treated him
badly, and he wanted to go to Freetown. The sababu, in consultation
with the paralegals, declared that in this case, the proper solution would
take into account Aruna's own wishes and what was best for him. John
had not cared for Aruna during the war years and now seemed to want
him only because he was old enough to work in the fields. Therefore,
John should not have custody of the boy. Instead, Aruna was sent to live
with his uncle, as the mother's family wished.
The hours of mediation were worth it. The sababu, the traditional
repository of authority over the marriage and its offspring, agreed with
the paralegals' assessment of the just solution in this custody case: Aruna
would not have to return to his natural father's home to be mistreated
and denied an education. I was thrilled and intrigued; for the first time
since my arrival in the tiny rural chiefdom of Bumpe Ngao, I had spon-
taneously heard mention of human rights and the best interests of the
child from someone other than the trained paralegals I assisted. It ap-
peared that the sababu not only vocalized the international human rights
norms of making decisions in a child's best interest9 and taking the
child's opinion into account,'0 but also implemented these norms in
Aruna's case. John was not happy, but he and Hawa's family both
7. The phrase "human rights" was always spoken in English.
8. Author's Field Notes, Bumpe Ngao Chiefdom, Bo District, Sierra Leone (June-
Aug. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Field Notes].
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 28
I.L.M. 1456.
10. Id. art. 12.
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accepted the decision of the sababu and paralegals as final and Aruna
went to live with his uncle in Freetown.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internalization of international norms has been described as "the
process by which nations incorporate international law concepts into
their domestic practice."" Scholars believe that norm internalization may
explain why and how states come to obey international law. 2 Some
international human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),'3
contemplate state responsibility for conforming domestic laws and
practices, including customary practices, to ensure compliance with
international human rights norms. 4 Though states may formally have this
responsibility, it is often nonstate actors at the local level who help bring
11. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (2001).
12. Id.
According to Koh, this process occurs through repeated interactions between states
and a variety of domestic and transnational actors, which produce interpretations of
applicable global norms and ultimately the internalization of those norms into
states' domestic values and processes. Rather than focusing narrowly on punitive
interactions between states, Koh sees "repeated participation in transnational legal
process" as the key factor in the move "from one-time grudging compliance" with
international norms "to habitual internalized obedience." Repeated interactions be-
tween states and a wide range of transnational actors accordingly become the
process by which norms created by international society are clarified and become
enmeshed into domestic society. "To the extent that those norms are successfully in-
ternalized, they become future determinants of why nations obey."
Id. (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2646 (1997)).
13. Article 2(f) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women states, with regard to discriminatory legislation and practices, that state parties
undertake to "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs, and practices which constitute discrimination against
women." Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) art. 2(f), Jan. 22, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). Article 5 states that
state parties shall take all appropriate measures:
[T]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.
Id. art. 5(a). For a detailed discussion on norm internalization in rural Africa, see infra Part IV.
14. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 426 (2000) (quoting Abdullahi Ahmed An-na'im, State Responsibility Under Inter-
national Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN 167, 175-76 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994)).
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domestic practices in line with human rights norms through a societal
internalization approach.
In this Note, I examine the process of international human rights
norm internalization into areas traditionally governed exclusively by cus-
tomary law, and the resulting evolution of customary law. Assuming,
arguendo, that customary law is to be modified, I argue that a societal
norm internalization approach is the most effective means to bring cus-
tomary law into conformity with international human rights law. After a
brief discussion of the fieldwork on which I rely, I describe the historical
influence of colonialism on the development of customary law in Africa,
with a particular focus on the repugnancy clauses of the colonial era.
Next, I explore the societal norm internalization approach and how it has
taken advantage of the openings provided by the contestation of cultural
norms on the local level in rural Africa. I then explain the evolution of
customary law in independent, post-colonial Sierra Leone. In particular,
I examine norm internalization in Sierra Leone in the context of child
custody and maintenance by exploring the interplay between interna-
tional human rights law, customary law, and the formal legal system.
These cases implicate both women's and children's rights issues 5 and
illustrate the internalization or acceptance of human rights principles in
customary law. Finally, I contrast this customary law context with that in
contemporary South Africa.
II. FIELDWORK BACKGROUND
Sierra Leone has 149 chiefdoms. In each, chiefdom authorities 6 are
responsible for adjudicating disputes utilizing customary law, but the
content of that law varies by ethnic group 7 and sometimes by chiefdom.
My work took place in the Bumpe Ngao chiefdom in Bo District, popu-
lated by the Mende tribe, and the fieldwork examples in this Note are
limited to that population, although many of the customary law obser-
vances likely apply in other chiefdoms in Sierra Leone.'8
15. Customary law has often been criticized for permitting domestic violence by hus-
bands against their wives, forced early marriage, or the resolution of rape cases by either
marriage to the perpetrator or a payment to the victim's family. See, e.g., Vivek Maru, Between
Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Justice Services in Sierra Leone and World-
wide, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 427 (2006). I do not focus on these important women's and
children's rights violations here because they are discussed extensively elsewhere and because
they did not form the majority of the cases I observed during my fieldwork.
16. Chiefdoms are administrative units, and their authorities include the paramount
chief, section chiefs, town chiefs, the local court chairmen, and other officials.
17. See Maru, supra note 15, at 436.
18. Mende in the Bumpe Ngao chiefdom are both Muslim and Christian. The custom-
ary law applied to the different religious groups within the Mende did not vary significantly in
Winter 2007)
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The field research is the result of my work for a small Sierra
Leonean nonprofit organization, Timap [Stand Up] for Justice, which
provides free legal aid through paralegals supervised by lawyers to the
rural poor in criminal and civil cases. The paralegals are all trained in the
formal Sierra Leone legal system and relevant international law. They
have at least a rudimentary understanding of women's and children's
rights under international instruments, such as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Having grown up under the customary law system,
they are also familiar with the traditional legal principles of rural Sierra
Leone. '9
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Customary Law and the Legacy of Colonialism in Africa
The colonial experience in Africa had a profound effect on the cur-
rent legal system in the former colonies.20 As Mahmood Mamdani
writes:
The African colonial experience came to be crystallized in the
nature of the state forged through that encounter. Organized dif-
ferently in rural areas from urban ones, that state was Janus-
faced, bifurcated. It contained a duality: two forms of power un-
der a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke the
language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of commu-
nity and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights,
customary power pledged to enforce tradition. The former was
organized on the principle of differentiation to check the concen-
tration of power, the latter around the principle of fusion to
my personal experience; rather, tenets of Islamic personal law were incorporated into what
was generally termed customary law. One difference was that an imam was sometimes invited
to participate as a community leader during mediations with Muslim parties.
19. In general, the level of formal education is very low in Sierra Leone. According to
the 2004 Human Development Index, there is an overall adult literacy rate of 35.1%. U.N.
Dev. Programme, Country Fact Sheet: Sierra Leone Development Index 2004, in HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr20O6/statistics/countries/country-fact-
sheets/ctyfs_SLE.html. This rate is lower in rural areas. The level of education about interna-
tional human rights norms is more difficult to gauge. The general population in the rural areas
has some familiarity with basic human fights concepts. Some of this familiarity stems from
the war and rebuilding experience and the corresponding presence of many international or-
ganizations engaged in demobilization and reconstruction efforts. However, most of the rural
population would probably not be familiar with the content of particular international human
rights instruments.
20. See, e.g., A.N. Allott, What is to be Done with African Customary Law? The Ex-
perience of Problems and Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950, 28 J. AFR. L. 56 (1984).
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ensure a unitary authority .... [E]ach signified one face of the
same bifurcated state.2
Customary law-the traditional approach to promoting and enforc-
ing justice-has been defined as "those rules of conduct which the
persons living in a particular locality have come to recognize as govern-
ing them in their relationships between one another and between
themselves and things. ' 22 Customary law "derives from social practices
that the community concerned accepts as obligatory. ' 23 Customary law
scholar T.W. Bennett explains that in its original form, customary law
was unwritten and uncodified.24 In many parts of Africa, the colonial sys-
tem of indirect rule maintained but altered customary law.
Under this indirect rule, African chiefs were subordinated to the co-
lonial power, who in return enhanced the power of the chiefs vis- -vis
the local population.25 For example, in Sierra Leone, "the colonists des-
ignated 'chiefdoms' as the primary administrative unit in the
countryside, and 'paramount chiefs' as their rulers. 26 The paramount
chief is the "executive ruler of a chiefdom. 27 In the colonial era, the para-
mount chiefs designated Members of Parliament. After independence in
21. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 18 (1996).
22. A.A. KOLAJO, CUSTOMARY LAW IN NIGERIA THROUGH THE CASES 1 (2000).
23. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 1.
24. Id. at 2. In some regions, attempts were made by colonial governments to codify
and record customary law. See, e.g., infra note 42 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Beverley J. Stoeltje, Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Okello Ogwang, Introduc-
tion, Special Issue: Women, Language and Law in Africa, AFR. TODAY, Spring 2002, at vii.
They explain that:
As a consequence of this history as well as the diversity of cultures and religions in
Africa, multiple legal systems operate simultaneously in African societies today. In
any one location, legal systems and practices reflect the combined influences of in-
digenous forms of governance, the manipulation of those systems by colonial
powers (often known as "indirect rule"), Islam, which includes a system of law all
Muslims are expected to follow, and the various Western legal systems (French,
British, Belgian, etc.) established by the colonial powers wherever they established
domination, plus the policies associated with globalization. Although it is common
usage to use the term custom or customary law to represent the concept of the in-
digenous legal system, the use of this term has often been contested because it fails
to acknowledge that it was precisely these indigenous systems that colonial rulers
exploited and, in some cases, created.
Id. at xi-xii (emphasis in original).
26. Vivek Maru, The Challenges of African Legal Dualism: An Experiment in Sierra
Leone, JUST. INITIATIVES, Feb. 2005, at 18, 19, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/
publications/jinitiatives.
27. Maru, supra note 15, at 431 n.10.
28. Joe A.D. Alie, Background to the Conflict (1961-1991): What Went Wrong and
Why?, in BOUND TO COOPERATE: CONFLICT, PEACE AND PEOPLE IN SIERRA LEONE 15, 28
(Anatole Ayissi & Robin-Edward Poulton eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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196 1, political parties continued to woo the paramount chiefs and util-
ized them to consolidate political power. 9 Today there are still twelve
reserved seats in the Sierra Leone Parliament for paramount chiefs. °
Customary law in Africa is not one unified system of law but rather
varies by ethnic group; it can even vary in its implementation by com-
munity.3 Unrestricted by codification and precedent, 2 customary law is
constantly evolving and is influenced by external and internal factors.
This malleability can be a source of strength in the process of domestic
internalization of human rights norms at the rural level.33 Moreover,
"[t]hese systems of customary law are available and accessible to ordi-
nary people, who utilize them to meet their needs, while the traditional
authorities in these systems have adapted their roles successfully to ever
changing conditions."3 Vivek Maru notes that, in the case of Sierra
Leone, the customary institutions have deep cultural roots and for many
of the rural poor, they are the most accessible institutions.35
In Africa, the colonial powers established Western legal systems36
which often functioned alongside the customary legal system.37 Today,
these formal legal systems are still inaccessible to much of rural Africa,
making customary law the only law of relevance. In Sierra Leone, the
formal legal system, imported from the British common law system and
imposed during the colonial era, is largely irrelevant in the lives of the
vast majority of the rural population.39 The distance and disconnect be-
tween the formal and customary legal systems are exacerbated by
widespread poverty, disparities in formal education, geographic isola-
tion, and poor infrastructure. The rural poor simply can not afford or
access the formal legal system.40
29. See Maru, supra note 15, at 435 n.19. See also id. at 434-437 (describing the role
of paramount chiefs in the Sierra Leone and the dualist nature of the justice system).
30. Bureau of Afr. Affairs, Dep't of State, Background Note: Sierra Leone, Mar. 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm.
31. See KOLAJO, supra note 22, at 1.
32. See BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 3.
33. See infra Part IV (discussing human rights norm internalization).
34. Stoeltje et al., supra note 25, at xii.
35. Maru, supra note 15, at 461.
36. See Stoeltje et al., supra note 25, at xii.
37. See, e.g., N.J. BROOKE, NATIVE COURT SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE (1953) (describ-
ing colonial-era customary law in Sierra Leone).
38. See, e.g., Maru, supra note 15, at 436-37.
39. Maru discusses the dualist nature of the Sierra Leone legal system and its impact on
rural justice in Between Law and Society. See Maru, supra note 15.
40. Sierra Leone is ranked 176 out of 177 countries surveyed in the 2004 Human De-
velopment Index, which "provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human
development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated
(measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and
[Vol. 28:507
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In South Africa, a serious attempt was made to codify customary law
and transform it into a precedent-based system.' In 1927, the South Af-
rican Native Administration Act gave certain courts the discretion to
apply customary law in legal suits between Africans.4 '2 The courts and
anthropological fieldworkers sought to write down customary law, but
the authors brought a Western legal training to bear on their ma-
terial. Thus customary rules were grouped into common-law
categories, such as marriage, succession, and property, and
common-law concepts were freely used to describe customary
institutions. At the same time, the devices of precedent, codifica-
tion, and restatement were used to impose Western requirements
of certainty and stability.
43
As part of this process, South African courts interpreted and changed
customary law through their decisions, thereby creating "official" and
"non-official" versions of customary law." A.N. Allot has termed this
official customary law, which also developed in Ghana and Nigeria, "ju-
dicial customary law" and notes that it "might differ substantially from
the customary law actually followed by the people whose law it was, and
who in theory in a customary-law system can alone give legal recogni-
tion to customary rule.45
For example, South African "non-official" or "true" customary law
does not recognize a woman as a party in disputes over lobolo
("bridewealth"), marriage negotiations, or custody. In a customary mar-
riage, the lobolo agreement transfers the reproductive capacity of a
woman to her husband's family, with the result that her husband acquires
both custody and guardianship over their children. 6 In the case of an
unmarried woman, the guardianship of children vests in her father or
male guardian, since she is regarded as a minor under customary law.47
However, in 1966, a South African court in Sekupa v. Jonkman modified
customary law by holding that the natural mother of children in a cus-
48tody dispute could be regarded as a party in the action. This change was
having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income)." U.N.
Dev. Programme, supra note 19.
41. See T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 61-62 (1995) [hereinafter BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS].
42. See id. at 19.
43. Id. at 63.
44. See, e.g., Ignatius Maithufi, The Best Interests of the Child and African Customary
Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 137 (C.J. Davel ed., 2000).
45. Allott, supra note 20, at 60.
46. See Maithufi, supra note 44, at 143-44.
47. See id. at 145.
48. See id. at 143-44.
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possible in part due to the frequent interpretation of customary law by
the formal legal system inherited from colonial rule, rather than by those
who traditionally are empowered to interpret evolving customary law.
By contrast, in Sierra Leone, there have been few anthropological studies
of customary law 9 and no codification; customary law has continued to
evolve separately from the formal legal system and still has no internal
formal reliance on a system of precedent.
B. Customary Law During the Colonial Era:
Repugnancy Clauses
As part of the imposition of the colonial legal order, the British at-
tempted what might be termed an early type of norm internalization
through the use of the so-called repugnancy clauses. ° The repugnancy
clause is a legal provision stating that customary law could not be ap-
plied if it was contrary to natural justice or public policy." Historically,
most African nations colonized by the British retained a (modified) sys-
tem of customary law for indigenous people, but made this system
subject to the clause. These clauses gave the colonial power the ability to
retain decisionmaking in cases that would normally be governed by cus-
tomary law. As a result, Western notions of morality or justice could be
invoked to weaken the authority of customary law.
In South Africa, cases where the proviso was invoked included cases
on consent to marriage, sexual immorality, and succession by illegiti-
mate children.52 In Human Rights and African Customary Law, T.W.
Bennett writes:
The state has always assumed that it has complete discretion in
deciding whether, and to what extent, customary law should be
recognized. This is a legacy of thinking from the colonial era
.... Application and use of customary law during this period
could best be considered a revocable permission that, within cer-
tain statutorily defined limits-mainly marriage, family,
49. One exception is H.M. Joco SMART, SIERRA LEONE CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW
(1983), apparently the most recent such study.
50. For an excellent article including examples of repugnancy clauses and how they
were interpreted in colonial-era courts and in various cases in British colonial West Africa, see
W.C. Ekow Daniels, The Influence of Equity in West African Law, 11 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 31
(1962).
51. See BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 67. See also KOLAJO, supra note
22, at 13-14. See generally Daniels, supra note 50. The phrasing of the repugnancy clauses
sometimes varied; the wording in the 1933 Native Courts Ordinance of Sierra Leone indicated
that customary law could not be applied if it was "not repugnant to natural justice, equity and
good conscience." BROOKE, supra note 37, at 3.
52. See BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 68 n.246.
[Vol. 28:507
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succession and land tenure-Africans might organize their lives
according to their own cultural norms."
Given that repugnancy clauses sought to overrule customary law
based on natural justice and that the underpinnings of modern human
rights law also lie in natural justice, it might be tempting to view repug-
nancy clauses as an early interaction between a Western notion of human
rights and dignity and non-Western, traditional customary law. As David
Sidorsky writes, there is a "continuity between the traditional theory of
natural rights and recent formulations of human rights. '4
The use of colonial legal devices such as repugnancy clauses per-
haps foreshadows the constant debate in international human rights over
universality versus cultural relativism, often framed as a Northern or
Western notion of universality and a counterpoint advanced by the global
South. Given the political and philosophical objections to natural law
and natural rights," one scholar has noted that some now assume that "to
argue in terms of general principles or natural justice is to engage in a
political debate and to fall victim to bias and subjectivism. 5 6 Though
repugnancy clauses were arguably grounded in early conceptions of
what became known as human rights, they are invariably tainted by their
use as a colonial mechanism to assert power and cultural superiority over
the colonized 7 For example, some human rights norms, especially those
that oppose widespread traditional practices or promote gender equality,
53. See BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 20.
54. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 14, at 327 (quoting David Sidorsky, Contemporary
Reinterpretations of the Concept of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (David
Sidorsky ed., 1979)).
55. See, e.g., STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 14, at 324-26 (2000) (internal citation
omitted).
56. Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1948
(1990).
57. See generally Daniels, supra note 50. The cultural superiority of the British and the
power they had to impose that superiority on their colonial subjects is also described by Allott,
supra note 20, at 59.
These phrases, especially the famous repugnancy clause, appeared to give the green
light to appeal courts and supervising officers to delete what they did not like from
the institutions of the customary law under their care. Undoubtedly the justice and
morality to be applied in this task were British justice and morality; but the British
judges and administrators showed themselves more sensitive to local ideas of jus-
tice than was the case with the South African administrations; and these clauses
were only used to a limited degree to strike down certain features of the customary
law which were felt to be unjust [such as] marriage without the consent of a spouse.
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are often challenged by some in sub-Saharan Africa as concepts imposed
by the West.1
Repugnancy clauses have survived in various forms in the laws of
African states, leading to some ambiguity over how such provisions
should be reconciled with customary law. Bennett argues, in the context
of the new South African Constitution, that the "colonial anachronism"
of the repugnancy proviso should not be utilized "to screen customary
law for compliance with the Bill of Rights," because "public policy" and
"natural justice," the phrases used in the repugnancy proviso, "while...
informed by human rights ... contain superordinate values that tran-
scend even the Constitution."59 He further notes that the clause "will
always be linked to colonialism." 6 Therefore, in evaluating South Afri-
can customary law, compliance with the Constitution itself, rather than
the repugnancy proviso in its surviving form, should be paramount. Ben-
nett also notes with approval that many decolonized African states have
eliminated the repugnancy proviso altogether.6 '
In Sierra Leone, the repugnancy proviso remains enshrined in the
statutory definition of customary law,62 but it is rarely, if ever, invoked.63
Whatever the significance of its origins, its practical relevance, therefore,
58. Perhaps on no African human rights issue have viewpoints been so contentious as
they are regarding female genital mutilation. Although practiced regularly in Sierra Leone, this
issue is beyond the scope of my inquiry here. For more on the debate between traditional prac-
tices and gender equity, see VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN: WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN GHANA,
UGANDA, AND TANZANIA (Johanna Bond ed., 2005) (particularly the contributions by Bernice
Sam, Salma Maulidi, Margaret C. Oguli Oumo, and Monica E. Magoke Mhoja); Amnesty
International, Sierra Leone Women Face Abuses in Informal Legal Sector, May 2006, http://
web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR5/0022006.
59. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 68.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also, Derek Asiedu-Afrofi, Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary
Law in Nigeria, 37 AM. J. CoMp. L. 571, 577 (1989) (describing Ghana's abolishment of the
repugnancy clause and incorporation of customary law to the common law of Ghana).
62. Local Courts Act of 1963 § 3.
63. Other African countries which have retained some version of a repugnancy clause
do invoke it on occasion. In contemporary Nigeria, for example, the repugnancy proviso is
still utilized in a modified form by Nigerian courts. Kolajo writes that "[flor a customary law
to be valid and consequently binding and enforceable, it must pass three tests. First, it must
not be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. Secondly, it must not be in-
consistent with public policy. Thirdly, it must not be incompatible with any written law in
force at the time." He notes that although the repugnancy doctrine was a British colonial im-
port into Nigeria, "the doctrine has to be interpreted in the context of our jurisprudence which
includes the totality of our customary laws." Kolajo clarifies that a court decision that a cus-
tom is repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience signifies that the customary
law will not be applied in that case, not that the customary law is per se illegal. Legality of
customary law in Nigeria in his estimation comes from the consent of those who follow the
custom, giving it the force of law, but a customary law rule can be overruled by legislation.
KOLAJO, supra note 22, at 13-14.
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is extremely limited. As a result, the repugnancy clause is not a practical
means of norm internalization in Sierra Leone.
Beyond the repugnancy clause, other colonial-era legal mechanisms
had the potential to promote human rights norm internalization in Sierra
Leone. The governors of British colonial territories were formally in-
structed not to assent to bills of "discriminatory character," including any
that discriminated on racial or religious grounds.6M In addition, the United
Kingdom extended its obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights to its dependent colonial territories, meaning that "in the-
ory at least, human rights were protected under the European
Convention. ' 6 However, "[i]n practice it made no difference to life" on
the ground that the European Convention had been extended to the colo-
nies.66 Additionally, concerns over minority rights in the soon-to-be
independent Nigeria led British negotiators to incorporate a bill of rights
in the new constitution.67 In this way, the British colonial office "became
a leading exporter of human rights, and bills of rights featured in the in-
dependence constitutions of numerous former colonies ' 68 including
Sierra Leone. 69 However, these instruments were "aspirational and sym-
bolic ... with no practical effect,"70 and thus similar to the repugnancy
proviso.
IV. NORM INTERNALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW IN RURAL AFRICAN SOCIETIES
As noted above, some international human rights treaties contem-
plate state responsibility for conforming domestic laws and practices,
including customary practices, to ensure consistency with international
human rights norms. In order for a state to ensure compliance with inter-
national human rights norms, Abdullahi Ahmed An-na'im argues that
societies must first see these norms as legitimate; otherwise, the effort
64. S.A. de Smith, Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth (1), 10 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 83, 94 (1961). See also A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF
EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 846 (2001).
65. SIMPSON, supra note 64, at 844.
66. Id. at 851 (discussing the extension of the Convention to the Gold Coast of Ghana).
67. See CONSTITUTION, Ch. III (1960) (Nig.), available at www.nigeriacongress.org/
resources/constitution/nig_const_60.pdf.
68. SIMPSON, supra note 64, at 870. See also S.A. de Smith, Fundamental Rights in the
New Commonwealth (11), 10 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 215 (1961).
69. See CONSTITUTION (1961) (Sierra Leone). See de Smith, supra note 64, at 83 ("In
1960 a list of agreed provisions for fundamental rights, based on the Nigerian pattern, was
drawn up for inclusion in the Constitution of Sierra Leone upon the attainment of independ-
ence." (internal citations omitted)).
70. Interview with A.W. Brian Simpson, Charles F. and Edith J. Clyne Professor of
Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Jan. 30, 2007).
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may be seen and rejected as an "exercise in cultural imperialism. '7' Sec-
ondly, An-na'im states that
an effort to change religious and customary laws in accordance
with international human rights law should seek to persuade
people of the validity and utility of the change. Such persuasion
must, of course, be grounded in a complete and realistic under-
standing of the rationale and authority of these laws, and of the
way they operate in practice.72
An-na'im emphasizes that the goal of such persuasion should not be to
repudiate customary or religious law itself, but to bring it more "in con-
formity with international human rights law.
' 73
An-na-'im is not alone in advocating this approach. Sally Merry, in
her study of the translation of the international human rights norm
against gender violence into the local "vernacular," warns that "[h]uman
rights ideas, embedded in cultural assumptions about the nature of the
person, the community and the state, do not translate easily from one
setting to another. If human rights ideas are to have an impact, they need
to become part of the consciousness of ordinary people around the
world. 74
Though culture is often portrayed by the media or on the interna-
tional level as static and monolithic, anthropologists recognize that it is
dynamic, "hybrid and porous," and "a mode of legitimating claims to
power and authority.' 75 As Merry writes, "seeing culture as open to
change emphasizes struggles over cultural values within local communi-
ties and encourages attention to local cultural practices as resources for
change. 76 It is essential when studying the interaction between custom-
ary law and human rights law on the local level to be cognizant of how
culture itself is constantly contested. No one person can claim to speak
as the voice of a monolithic culture.
Many African women's organizations working to promote the hu-
man rights of women have recognized the dynamism of culture
described by Merry and used it to their advantage. Women in Law and
Development in Africa (WiLDAF) is an umbrella women's rights non-
profit with membership of organizations and individuals from dozens of
African countries.
71. An-na'im, supra note 14, at 168.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 8 (2006).
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id.
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WiLDAF members argue that nation-states invoke "culture" and
"tradition" to justify discriminatory or violent actions against
women and absolve themselves of responsibility .... In re-
sponse, WiLDAF and other organizations initially used the
language of human rights to [emphasize that the contested issues
were legal, not cultural]. But now they have replaced their idea
of culture as a static set of traditional practices with more so-
phisticated understandings of culture as dynamic, contested, and
infused with multiple power relations, perspectives, and inter-
pretations. Rather than dismissing "culture" as an obstacle to
women's rights, many recognize that cultural institutions can
change (as they always have), and there often exist alternative
cultural institutions that support and enhance women's rights.
Through education, legal reforms, and women's activism, among
other strategies, women (and men) can work to reshape the as-
pects of their culture that they find oppressive."
For members of WiLDAF and other human rights activists, customary
law can be viewed as a barrier to legal reforms that benefit women, at least
initially.
For WiLDAF, issues of culture and tradition are most prominent
in debates over customary and religious law. Most African states
still operate with multitiered legal systems .... WiLDAF argues
that current versions of customary law (and religious law) are se-
lective, retaining only those aspects that subordinate women [such
as divorce, marriage, and inheritance laws] .... Of course,
women in any given country do not necessarily share similar per-
spectives about the need to change certain cultural institutions .7
In recognizing that cultural institutions change over time and in encourag-
ing alternative cultural institutions that enhance women's rights, local
citizens who wish to promote or discourage certain practices are utilizing a
societal internalization approach-fostering change from within. Such
efforts are the most effective means of altering some customary law to
conform with international human rights norms. If the new social practices
are accepted as legitimate and obligatory by the community concerned,
they can themselves evolve into customary laws.
77. Dorothy L. Hodgson, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Women in Law and Devel-
opment in Africa (WiLDAF), AFR. TODAY, Summer 2002, at 11-12 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 12-13.
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V. CUSTOMARY LAW IN INDEPENDENT SIERRA LEONE
When the interior of Sierra Leone became a British protectorate in
1896, the colonial Sierra Leonean legislature passed a law recognizing the
continued administration of customary law through "courts of the native
chiefs." 9 After independence in 1961, the Sierra Leonean Parliament
passed the 1963 Local Courts Act, renaming these native courts,0 reform-
ing them by authorizing paramount chiefs to appoint court chairmen
(rather than paramount chiefs sitting themselves in judgment), and giving
the local courts continued formal legal recognition as the arbiters of cus-
tomary law.8' The act defined customary law as:
[A]ny rule, other than a rule of general law, having the force of
law in any chiefdom of the Provinces whereby rights and
correlative duties have been acquired or imposed which is
applicable in any particular case and conforms with natural justice
and equity and not incompatible, either directly or indirectly, with
any enactment applying to the Provinces, and includes any
amendments of customary law made in accordance with any
enactment.82
This very formal legal definition of customary law in Sierra Leone
subordinates it to enactments of Parliament and natural law and equity.
The repugnancy proviso imposed under the colonial legal system therefore
survived after independence in Sierra Leone as in South Africa, and
though seldom invoked, it theoretically restricts the validity of customary
law based on natural justice or equity-based notions of human rights.
The 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution defines the laws of Sierra Leone
as comprised of the Constitution itself, laws made by Parliament, statutory
instruments, the existing law, and the common law.83 Common law here
refers to both customary law, which is not defined, and the English com-
mon law. The Constitution prohibits discriminatory laws,s with an
exception for laws that regulate, among other areas, "adoption, marriage,
divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of per-
sonal law,"5 and allows for the application of customary law to "members
79. Maru, supra note 15, at 435 n.19. See also BROOKE, supra note 37, at 5 (citing the
Protectorate Courts ordinance No. 20 of 1896).
80. Local Courts Act of 1963 § 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2.
83. CONSTITUTION § 170 (1991) (Sierra Leone), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Laws/constitution 1991 .pdf.
84. Id. § 27.
85. Id. § 27(4)(d).
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of a particular race or tribe. 86 As Amnesty International has reported, "this
means that discriminatory laws on such matters [traditionally governed by
customary law] are not necessarily unlawful under the Constitution. 87
Sierra Leone's legal regime also consists of its international legal ob-
ligations. Though Sierra Leone has ratified numerous international human
rights treaties," in many cases the treaty provisions have not been incorpo-
rated into domestic law.t 9 In addition, international human rights
organizations often criticize Sierra Leone for violating human rights en-
shrined in these treaty obligations through the observance of customary
law.90
The local courts are the only institution permitted to adjudicate cus-
tomary law in Sierra Leone under the 1963 Local Courts Act.9 In fact,
Section 40 of the Act protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the local courts
by allowing the imposition of fines or a maximum three-month imprison-
ment for any person who exercises judicial power within the area of
jurisdiction of a local court.92 The Act granted jurisdiction to the local
courts for civil cases and criminal cases "where the maximum punishment
which may be imposed does not exceed a fine of two hundred Leones or
imprisonment for a period of one year or both."93 In practice, the local
courts also adjudicate disputes for which they have no jurisdiction, such as
cases where the charge could bring a maximum punishment of more than
one year of imprisonment.
86. Id. § 27(4)(e).
87. Amnesty Int'l, Briefing Paper-Sierra Leone: No One to Turn To: Women's Lack of
Access to Justice in Rural Sierra Leone, Dec. 6, 2005, at 4, available at http://web.amnesty.
org/library/pdf/AFR510112005ENGLISH/$File/AFR5101105.pdf (emphasis in original).
88. For a comprehensive list of UN human rights treaties to which Sierra Leone is a
party, see Sierra Leone, Ratification History, http://www.bayefsky.conhtml/sierraleone tl
ratifications.php.
89. Sierra Leone has not only lagged in incorporating treaty provisions into domestic
law, but it also rarely submits reports on its treaty compliance to the respective treaty bodies.
For example, Sierra Leone ratified CEDAW in November 1988, but it has not yet submitted a
report to the CEDAW Committee on its compliance. See State Reports, CRC-Sierra Leone,
http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/reports/state/154/node/5/treaty/crc.
90. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, supra note 87.
91. Local Courts Act of 1963 § 40.
92. Id.
93. Local Courts Act of 1963 § 13, amended by Local Courts (Amendment) Act of
1965 § 5, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1965-29.pdf. The monetary limit for
jurisdiction has been outdated for decades but has not been formally changed by legislation
since 1965. Today 200 Leones is the equivalent of $.07.
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Customary law officers94 have the power to review the decisions of lo-
cal courts. However, there are only three such officers for the entire
country,95 and significant practical difficulties-including expense, travel,
and lack of knowledge-face a party who wishes to appeal a local court
judgment, so review by customary law officers occurs rarely. The local
court chairman in Bumpe proudly claimed that only one of his cases was
ever appealed to the customary law officer during his tenure, and that his
decision had been affirmed in that case.96 Theoretically, individuals also
have a right of appeal from a local court into the formal court system, but
this is rarely exercised, again due to lack of knowledge and resources.97
The Local Courts Act also bars lawyers from the local courts.98
In practice, village and section chiefs99 have traditionally applied
customary law, despite their lack of jurisdiction under the formal legal
system. '°° If a dispute is not solved within a family or between the fami-
lies involved, a party generally will bring the case to the village chief for
adjudication. If a party is not satisfied with the village chief's determina-
tion, she can then appeal up the chiefdom hierarchy to a section chief or
to the paramount chief himself, or, as noted supra, she can take the dis-
pute to a formal local court in the chiefdom. As long as both parties
come to the chief voluntarily and he acts as a mediator-not imposing
any punishment or fine-the chief has not violated the Local Courts Act.
However, village chiefs will often adjudicate claims for a fee, issue
94. As Maru notes, these customary law officers are lawyers and members of the ex-
ecutive branch, serving in the Attorney General's office, who supervise local court chairmen
and review the decisions of the officially sanctioned local courts. "The same men double as
the only public prosecutors working in the formal courts in the provinces." See Maru, supra
note 15, at 437.
95. See id. at 437.
96. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
97. See, e.g., LAWYERS' CENTRE FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE & GLOBAL RIGHTS, A HAND-
BOOK FOR PARALEGALS IN SIERRA LEONE 80 (2004). It states, in relevant part:
Although the right of appeal is guaranteed by the Constitution, the ability of most
citizens to do so is seriously compromised by poverty. Navigating through the
lengthy appeals process is complicated, and is only possible for those with money
to hire a counsel over the long term and, more frustrating for those outside Free-
town, traveling and supporting themselves while they are away from home to attend
hearings.
Id.
98. Local Courts Act of 1963 § 15. Given that there are only about 100 practicing law-
yers in the entire country of Sierra Leone, the vast majority in the capital, even if this formal
prohibition were changed, most parties still would not be able to take advantage of a lawyer's
services.
99. Chiefdoms are divided into sections, each of which contains a number of villages;
the section chief is the head of the section and is subordinate to the paramount chief of the
whole chiefdom.
100. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
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summons, conduct hearings, pronounce judgments alone or with a group
of elders, or collect fines in violation of the Local Courts Act."'
VI. NORM INTERNALIZATION IN INDEPENDENT SIERRA LEONE
African customary law is often described as based on an
essentialized view of culture and tradition,' 02 yet this view ignores the
practical reality of customary law. While local court chairmen in Sierra
Leone are recognized as the sanctioned authorities on the application of
customary law in a chiefdom, their interpretations are not monolithic or
static but rather evolve with the changing values of the community. Nor
are the local court chairmen the only actors who implement customary
law. Local village chiefs often adjudicate disputes between members of
the community under customary law,0 or a local women's leader may be
called upon to settle a conflict. Within families, elders often settle
disputes based on their understanding of cultural norms and traditions.04
With such a wide variety of participants constructing customary law, it is
clear that though the local court chairman is formally recognized by the
state as the repository of customary law, he is not the sole locus of its
interpretation and application. Space for variation and change exists on
the local level. The very derivation of customary law "from social
practices that the community concerned accepts as obligatory"'0 5
recognizes that the community's attitude and acceptance is what
ultimately transforms the customs or traditions into law.
Kaniya, located in Bumpe Ngao chiefdom, is an example of the
changing nature of local institutions which has opened up space for a
more fluid vision of culture that promotes women's rights, potentially
facilitating the internalization of human rights norms. In Kaniya, the lo-
cal court chairman regularly consulted with one of the paralegals of
Timap for Justice for her advice on cases before him, and the paralegal
was also able to go to the chairman for assistance in her cases. In one
notable case,' °6 a young mother of three came to a paralegal for assis-
tance. Her husband had recently married a second wife, and while he and
his new bride slept on a large, comfortable wooden bed, he relegated his
first wife to sleep with her suckling baby and other children on the bare,
damp, dirt floor with no sheets in the next room, denying her even oil for
101. See generally Maru, supra note 15.
102. See Andrew Apter, Africa, Empire and Anthropology: A Philological Exploration of
Anthropology's Heart of Darkness, 28 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580 (1999).
103. See Maru, supra note 15, at 431.
104. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
105. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 1.
106. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
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a lamp. The first wife was discontented, as well as concerned with the
health of her children.
In a mediation session, the young husband proved resistant to the
paralegal's efforts to encourage him to treat his wives equally, as dictated
by customary law. The paralegal sought assistance from the local court
chairman, who investigated the situation himself.' 7 His sense of justice
was also offended, as it was clear that the young man, a diamond miner,
had the means to build his first wife a bed and provide basic supplies.
The young man rebuffed requests from dismayed family elders and the
court chairman to provide a bed and sheets for his first wife. The court
chairman then told him that if he did not provide her with a bed, the
chairman would use his authority under customary law to order the hus-
band to switch sleeping quarters with his first wife and sleep on the
ground himself. Needless to say, the young man provided his first wife
with sheets, a bed, and kerosene for her lamp within days.
The court chairman's approach to the case was based on customary
law, which, in Sierra Leone, often internalizes Islamic law when the par-
ties to a dispute are Muslim.'08 The following verses from the Quran are
instructive:
If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans,
marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye
fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only
one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess. That will be
more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice.'09
Amira Mashhour notes that "[a]lthough the concept of 'justice' that is
used in these two verses is not clearly defined in the Quran, the com-
mentators of the Quran 'unanimously' interpret justice-in this
context-to mean equal treatment [of one's wives] in respect to food,
clothing, and housing.""0 This interpretation of equal treatment in basic
needs was the essence of the court chairman's argument."' Under cus-
107. As a respected and relatively affluent Muslim man in the chiefdom, the court
chairman himself had multiple wives and was not hostile to polygamy per se.
108. Hanatu Kabbah, Sierra Leone Legal System and Legal Research, GLOBALEX, Nov.
2006, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/SierraLeone.htm. The incorporation of Islamic
law into customary law where the participants are Muslim has a long history, having been
noted by scholars in 1962. See Daniels, supra note 50, at 56.
109. A. YUSUF ALl, THE HOLY QU'RAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY Sura 4,
verse 3 (1983).
110. Amira Mashhour, Islamic Law and Gender Equality-Could There be a Common
Ground? A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in
Tunisia and Egypt, 27 HuM. RTs. Q. 562, 570 (2005).
Ill. See A.M. SERAJUDDIN, SHARI'A LAW AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA 129, 131 (2001).
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tomary law, as under Islamic law, the equal treatment of wives is
strongly encouraged but not mandatory. The court chairman's strong in-
sistence on the husband's respect for the needs of his first wife and their
children in this case, and his similar reasoning in prior cases, indicated a
progressive interpretation of customary law. In addition to the principles
of Islamic law internalized in customary law, the court chairman may
also have been influenced by international human rights norms"2 learned
through his ongoing interactions with the female paralegal."3
Many grassroots organizations and activists, including Timap and
members of WiLDAF, embrace societal internalization as a strategy to
promote positive social change from within. While not aiming overtly to
bring customary international law in line with international human rights
law, Timap paralegals recognize that the just resolution of many disputes
often has the additional benefit of promoting human rights. 114 The local
court chairman's actions in this case show evidence of some human
rights norm internalization in rural Sierra Leone within the evolving cus-
tomary law system. When summoned by the paralegal for assistance, the
chairman relied upon the customary and Islamic law principle of treating
wives equally and providing for children. He did not formally invoke
women's or children's rights language when speaking to the husband,
although in speaking privately, the chairman sometimes did refer to these
principles. Regardless of his motivations, the chairman's intervention
and resulting demand that the first wife and her children receive the
same treatment as the second wife promoted the rights of the first wife
and her children by improving their access to material needs.
[C]lassical [Islamic] jurists regard the polygamy permission clause of verse IV:3 as
having legal force and the strong words of the justice clause as being only a private
recommendation .... Although the Shari'a law permits polygamy, it strictly regu-
lates the conduct of the husband in relation to his wives and confers certain
important rights on [the wives]. Each of the several wives is entitled to equal and
impartial treatment from the husband. The principle of equal treatment between
wives applies among other things to time passed [by the husband] in the company
of each wife and the food, clothes, and lodgings provided to them.
Id.
112. International human rights norms that would apply in this situation include one
norm found in Article 6 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights
of Women in Africa, which states that while monogamy is encouraged, "the rights of women
in marriage and family including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and pro-
tected." Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' on the Rights of Women in
Africa art. 6, adopted July 11, 2003, CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005).
113. As the government had not provided training since the war began, Timap for Justice
provided legal training to the local court chairmen which included human rights law at the
request of the local officials. My presence as a Western outsider may also have played a role in
the chairman's response.
114. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
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Paralegals in these situations are not trained or encouraged to change
customary law; their goal is merely to promote justice through assisting
individuals, families, and communities."' As actors within the customary
law context who also value the strength of their communities and tradi-
tions, the paralegals recognize that customary law is the dominant source
of law for their work in rural Sierra Leone and often is the tool best
suited to promote justice. However, the paralegals' work is also informed
by their training in international human rights law and the formal legal
system, which can be used to resolve particular cases. Due to this train-
ing, it is not surprising that the paralegals would invoke principles such
as women's and children's rights, as in this case and the case of Aruna
detailed supra. However, it is noteworthy when non-paralegals such as
the court chairman and the sababu rely on these principles during a me-
diation. When a respected leader of the community is willing to utilize
principles that may not be explicitly recognized by traditional customary
law, it evidences his personal recognition of the legitimacy of these prin-
ciples and demonstrates that customary law is constantly evolving to
incorporate these norms.
In many cases, customary law, formal Sierra Leone law, and interna-
tional human rights law align rather than oppose each other in bringing
about justice. In addition, as Maru writes,
some of the values often attributed to international human rights
(with their origins in the European legal tradition) are also pre-
sent in the traditions of Sierra Leone, and it's a matter of
evolution and contestation between the various values "internal"
to traditional Sierra Leonean culture as much as it is an interac-
tion between [Sierra Leonean] culture and the outside world." 6
Each source of law may present different remedies or justification
for action, or one may provide a remedy where another does not.' ' 7 The
paralegals and their allies within the communities use many approaches,
often in conjunction, taking advantage of the dynamism of culture and
the evolving nature of customary law when faced with a justice issue.
115. Timap for Justice, Guiding Principles for All Staff, http://www.timapforjustice.org/
work/ ("Solving justice problems: The aim of our work is to help people achieve concrete,
practical solutions to their justice problems.").
116. E-mail from Vivek Maru, co-founder and co-director, Timap for Justice, to author
(Feb. 21, 2007) (on file with author).
117. A good example of this phenomenon is the law on child support payments. See
discussion infra Part VII.
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VII. CUSTODY, MAINTENANCE, AND BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD IN INDEPENDENT SIERRA LEONE
We walked five miles in the morning to a town called Foya where we
held a monthly mobile clinic for residents from Foya and the surround-
ing areas. A mother of two shy, young children, a boy and a girl,
approached for help.' 8 She explained that her husband had disappeared,
and she had been caring for the children alone without any support or
maintenance from the husband or his family for months. We requested
that the husband's brothers explain that family's perspective. One of the
brothers was a teacher at a local school and thus was well-known to the
paralegals and comparatively affluent in the region. He acknowledged
that the family did not help support the woman or her children, but
added that she had refused to return to his brother, and "in Africa, if a
woman divorces a man, she deserves to suffer."" 9
A female paralegal, a former teacher and colleague of this man, tried
to refocus the mediation. The paralegal explained that the issue we were
examining was not who bore the blame for the separation-under both
customary and formal law, a woman could not be forced to remain in a
marriage, so that was a moot point. Rather, we were concerned about the
well-being of the children and their maintenance; the children should not
be the ones to suffer from the divorce. The brother acknowledged that
this was true, and agreed that the children's well-being was the responsi-
bility of his extended family on behalf of his brother.' 20 This case
required a few further sessions so the husband's family could "hang
heads" and decide how they wished to provide for the children. It was
ultimately agreed that the older boy would live in a nearby town with
one of the teacher's wives and families in order to attend school 12' and be
fed and housed, while the younger girl would remain with her mother
until school-aged with help for food from the husband's family.
This arrangement conformed to Mende customary traditions of cus-
tody and maintenance in cases of separation or divorce. Under this
custom, the husband's family is expected to provide support for all chil-
dren but also has decision-making power over the children's residence
once they reach school-age. Younger children are generally allowed to
118. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
119. This is a traditional Mende saying which was perhaps voiced for my benefit as a
foreigner.
120. The brother described his brother as an "irresponsible monkey, always swinging
from place to place."
121. In this case, the primary school was located five miles away from the village; in
addition to this difficulty, the mother had no money to pay for school uniforms or school sup-
plies.
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continue living with their mother.'22 In this case, after a discussion be-
tween various members of the husband's extended family, the mother,
and the paralegals about what situation was best for the children, all par-
ties recognized that the mother's financial situation prevented her from
feeding and educating the children. The paralegals and the husband's
brothers approached the question of the best interest of the children in
terms of providing for future physical and educational needs. Unlike a
Western negotiation on child custody, there was no mention of emotional
bonding between the children and their mother. While the mother initially
asked the paralegals to assist her in obtaining maintenance from her hus-
band's family to care for her children herself, during the mediations the
mother did not vocalize any other needs or state a preference for the chil-
dren to continue in her custody. Rather, the mother relinquished her
custody claim over the older child when her former brother-in-law
agreed to take responsibility for her son's upkeep and schooling.'
23
Amstrong has noted a similarity to this process among the Shona in
Zimbabwe when making arrangements for child custody:
It is not only the paternal family which believes in its right to the
children, but the mother and the maternal family as well. There-
fore, it appears that in most cases there is no "dispute," it is
simply assumed that the children of divorced parents will go
with the father's family .... [E]ven when the mother is going to
have custody of the child for a while, it is assumed that the child
will go back to its father's family eventually. So that, even if the
best interests of a child in the short term are to be with its
mother, in the long term it needs to make the connection with its
father's family. 24
The Mende beliefs appeared to be consistent with Amstrong's obser-
vations of the Shona. Some of Amstrong's interviewees linked paternal
custodial rights to paternal ancestral spirits or the payment of
bridewealth, but more often, "custom" was linked to economic re-
sources.12 Since women have fewer economic resources and it is very
difficult to obtain an order for (or effective enforcement of) child support
payments, the child's "best interests are perceived to lie with the parent
122. See, e.g., SMART supra note 49.
123. Her acquiescence was perhaps due to respect for cultural norms, which mandate
that children over a certain age belong to the husband's family, as well as concerns over her
own financial ability to continue to care for them properly without assistance, rather than a
desire to relinquish physical custody.
124. Alice Armstrong, School and Sadza: Custody and the Best Interests of the Child in
Zimbabwe, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 151, 174 (1994).
125. Id. at 175.
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who can better provide for the child materially.' 26 In her research, Arm-
strong saw evidence that taking custody of the child was often a
substitute for a father's paying maintenance. 21
In the case above, the paralegals and the members of the two fami-
lies accounted for the best interests of the children when making the
custody arrangements. How the best interests of the child as a human
rights principle is applied, however, is very different in a context where
the basic material needs of food, clothing, and schooling are difficult to
fulfill. In addition, this case illustrates two of the strengths of children's
rights under the customary legal system. First, the formal system in Si-
erra Leone requires a father to support his children. However, under the
outdated statute applicable in these situations, child support payments
are limited to 100 Leones a week, about .04 U.S. dollars.'2 8 Under cus-
tomary law, a father also has parental responsibility for maintenance, but
there is no monetary limit, so a fair sum can be agreed upon.
Second, a father shares the responsibility for his children with his
family under customary law.29 Here, the father was nowhere to be found,
and yet his brothers, the paternal uncles of the children, readily acknowl-
edged their own responsibility for the children in their brother's absence.
Indeed, the dispute was only over how that responsibility should be ex-
ercised, not whether the brothers owed a duty to the children. Under the
formal legal system, responsibility for children is individual rather than
familial and collective. Had the mother taken her case through the formal
system, she would have been legally unprotected if she could not locate
the children's father.
The best interest of the children was not the only factor considered
in this mediation. While acknowledging his responsibility as an uncle,
the teacher also explicitly referred to what he viewed as the mother's bad
behavior in refusing to take back her husband after his frequent comings
and goings. Perhaps he meant to exonerate or excuse his family in ne-
glecting their duties towards the children up to that point. When asked,
however, whether his family was trying to make the children suffer for
the faults of their mother, the teacher quickly vocalized his family's
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Maru, supra note 15, at 454. For comparison, during other child support media-
tions in Bumpe from May to August 2005, monthly maintenance agreements were the
equivalent of about five to ten dollars a month, which was deemed fair given the low cash
income of most rural inhabitants. In contrast, the World Bank defines extreme economic pov-
erty in the developing world, including sub-Saharan Africa, as living on less than one dollar
per day. See The World Bank PovertyNet, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/O,,contentMDK:20153855-menuPK:435040-pagePK: 1489
56-piPK:216618-theSitePK:430367,00.html.
129. See Field Notes, supra note 8.
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responsibility for the children. Perhaps not surprisingly, Armstrong also
found some cases in Zimbabwe in which the parties invoked
an implicit argument that a woman who behaves "badly" in
terms of traditional expectations cannot be a good mother to her
children, and conversely that it is in the best interests of the child
to be in the custody of a person who does conform to traditional
expectations. In the case of women, the traditional expectations
are that she must be married, submissive, follow her husband's
orders and defer to his decisions, avoid independent action, be a
hard worker, etc. 3°
In this mediation, the paralegals again drew on a variety of sources
of law in order to arrive at a just outcome. In this case, the internal cus-
tomary law principles and children's rights principles under international
human rights law again worked in tandem, while the formal legal sys-
tem's approach was ignored as irrelevant or unhelpful.
VIII. CUSTOMARY LAW IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
Contemporary South Africa provides another example of internaliza-
tion of international human rights norms into areas traditionally
governed by customary law. South Africa's constitutional revolution ac-
companied the fall of apartheid and provides an important window into
the interaction between international human rights law and traditional
customary law in contemporary African society.
Adopted in 1996, the South African Constitution attempts to en-
shrine human rights protections and was intended to "heal the divisions
of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental human rights."'' 3' The founding values of the
Constitution are the rights to equality, human dignity, and liberty. Not
only has the "new" South Africa ratified many international human
rights treaties 3 2 and made reference to international law a mandatory
part of the constitutional interpretation of its Bill of Rights, 133 but it also
explicitly adopts many international human rights norms. For example,
socioeconomic rights such as access to housing'"4 are justiciable in South
Africa.
130. Armstrong, supra note 124, at 167.
131. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, pmbl.
132. For a comprehensive list of human rights treaties to which South Africa is a party,
see South Africa, Ratification History, http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/southafricatl
ratifications.pdf.
133. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1)(b).
134. Id. § 26.
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The 1996 Constitution also explicitly recognizes traditional custom-
ary law and leaders.'35 Traditional leaders participated in the
constitutional negotiations,'3 6 and a battle during the negotiations pitted
women's rights advocates against traditional leaders who felt that sub-
jecting customary law to the Bill of Rights, particularly the equality
provision, threatened established customs. 3 7 The outcome was that the
final South African Constitution, while recognizing customary law, also
clearly indicates that customary law, like all other South African law, is
subservient to the Bill of Rights.'38 Chapter 12 of the Constitution con-
cerns traditional leaders and customary law. It recognizes "the
institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to custom-
ary law"'39 and provides that "[t]he courts must apply customary law
when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legisla-
tion that specifically deals with customary law."'
4 0
The right to culture is also enshrined in the Constitution in Sections
30 and 31, and "although neither section in fact makes any reference to
customary law, it is generally taken to be a significant element of the
African cultural tradition."' 4' Culture in an anthropological sense is "a
repertoire of assorted practices and discourses that individuals generate
through disputes over signs and meanings" that is not static, but rather
negotiated and constructed.'4 2 The right to culture in international and
constitutional law, however, typically refers to "a concrete norm or prac-
tice specific to a particular social group,'' 43 and it has been asserted "to
counter the ubiquitous drift towards Western values and attitudes."'"
In addition to Chapter 12, Section 39(2) of the Constitution man-
dates that, "when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must pro-
mote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.' 43 Section
39(3) reinforces the primacy of the Bill of Rights by stating that "[t]he
Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or free-
doms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.'
4 6
135. Id. atch. 12.
136. CATHERINE BARNES & ELDRED DE KLERK, CONCILIATION RES., SOUTH AFRICA'S
MULTI-PARTY CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS (2002).
137. See BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 20-23.
138. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(3).
139. Id. § 211(1).
140. Id. § 211(3).
141. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 5, at 78.
142. Id. at 79.
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id.
145. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(2).
146. Id. § 39(3).
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Ultimately, when a provision of customary law violates a right in the Bill
of Rights, it can be struck down as unconstitutional,' 7 unless it passes
the Section 36 limitations clause analysis.
4 8
The South African Law Commission (SALC)149 has also prompted
the internalization of human rights norms in South Africa. Established in
1973, SALC is an advisory body whose current mandate is to make rec-
ommendations to the South African Parliament on the legal changes
necessary to bring laws into conformity with the new South African legal
order through reports and draft bills.'50 Customary law has constituted a
focus for SALC. 5' SALC members, who include legal scholars, justices,
and a member of the Commission on Gender Equity, developed recom-
mendations for reform of customary law, including formal recognition of
customary courts and changes to their jurisdiction and appeals process.'52
SALC recommended that customary courts should generally have civil
jurisdiction over matters arising out of customary law, with an explicit
exception for matters related to dissolution of marriage, custody and
guardianship of minors, and maintenance.' SALC noted that women's
groups strongly supported this recommendation, but traditional leaders
opposed it as a limitation on their authority. SALC determined that
"[t]his suggestion takes into account the values of equality and non-
sexism in the Constitution and the principle of the 'best interests of the
child.''
' 54
The Constitution itself also mandated the formation of "Chapter 9"
bodies,'55 which play a vital role in the promotion, protection, and moni-
toring of human rights in South Africa. 5 6 These independent state
institutions include the South African Human Rights Commission and
the Commission for Gender Equity. Justice Yvonne Mokgoro of the Con-
stitutional Court emphasized the important role these institutions play in
147. See, e.g., Bhe and Others v. Magistrate 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
148. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36.
149. The South African Law Commission was recently renamed the South African Law
Reform Commission. The original name has been used in this piece as that was the name in
use when the relevant reports were issued.
150. See South African Law Reform Commission, Welcome, http://www.doj.gov.za/
salrc/index.htm.
151. See S. AFR. LAW COMM'N, PROJECT 90, TRADITIONAL COURTS AND THE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS (2003), http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r-prj9O-
tradlead_2003jan.pdf.
152. Id.
153. Id. at xi.
154. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
155. The bodies are named for their establishment under Chapter 9 of the 1996 Constitu-
tion.
156. S. AFR. CONST. 1996§§ 181, 184, 187.
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improving customary law for women.'57 Justice Mokgoro also stressed
the significant number of nongovernmental organizations that work on
the grassroots level to disseminate human rights information.'5 8 Many of
these groups conduct trainings for traditional leaders and attempt to
bring customary law into conformity with the Constitution through sen-
sitization, advocacy, and legal test cases.'59 All of these efforts by various
state institutions and nonprofit actors are examples of attempts to inter-
nalize international and constitutional human rights norms into
customary law.
The Bhe case in the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 2004 ex-
emplifies internalization of human rights norms by reforming customary
law through the formal legal system.' 60 In Bhe, the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutional validity of the principle of primogeniture in the context
of the customary law of succession,16' and the Black Administration Act
38 of 1927 (the BLA) , which dealt with intestate estates of deceased
Africans. Justice Langa wrote of the relationship between the South Af-
rican Constitution and customary law in South Africa:
Quite clearly the Constitution itself envisages a place for cus-
tomary law in our legal system. Certain provisions of the
Constitution put it beyond doubt that our basic law specifically
requires that customary law should be accommodated, not
merely tolerated, as part of South African law, provided the par-
ticular rules or provisions are not in conflict with the
Constitution.
Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution entrench respect for cul-
tural diversity. Further, section 39(2) specifically requires a court
interpreting customary law to promote the spirit, purport and ob-
jects of the Bill of Rights.
In similar vein, section 39(3) states that the Bill of Rights does
not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are
recognised or conferred by customary law as long as they are
consistent with the Bill of Rights. Finally, section 211 protects
157. Interview with Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Ann
Arbor, Mich. (Jan. 2006).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Bhe and Others v. Magistrate 2005 (1) BCLR I (CC) (S. Afr.).
161. The rule of primogeniture, common in customary law in communities across Af-
rica, is that the first born male of the deceased is the intestate heir, followed by other male
relatives if there are no male children. Women are excluded from inheriting. See, e.g., id. at
para. 77. As the majority of rural Africans' estates are governed by customary law, this princi-
ple generally excludes women from inheriting property.
162. Id. at para. 3.
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those institutions that are unique to customary law .... It fol-
lows from this that customary law must be interpreted by the
courts, as first and foremost answering to the contents of the
Constitution. It is protected by and subject to the Constitution in
its own right.1
63
The Bhe court decided that the customary law principle of primo-
geniture constituted unfair discrimination on the basis of gender and
birth. Customary law also violated the equality and human dignity provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights, as it excluded widows from inheriting from
their intestate husbands, daughters from their parents, and extramarital
children from their fathers.' 64 The court also concluded that the "limita-
tion it impose[d was] not reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society founded on the values of equality, human dignity and
freedom."1
65
In determining that this particular customary law violated the Bill of
Rights, the court displayed a sophisticated understanding of customary
law in contemporary South Africa. It discussed at length the context in
which the rule operated and what purpose it served, noting that it was
designed to preserve the extended family unit, and that the family head
who inherited was traditionally obligated to assume all responsibilities
of maintenance and support for family members under his guardian-
ship. '66 However, the court also noted that circumstances had changed
such that "the succession of the heir to the assets of the deceased does
not necessarily correspond in practice with an enforceable responsibility
to provide support and maintenance to the family and dependents of the
deceased."'' 67 This change was due in part to the emergence of modem
urban communities and nuclear family structures, as opposed to tradi-
tional, extended family structures. The court noted that although the
"inherent flexibility" of the customary law system is one of its
strengths, 6 ' "the rules of succession in customary law have not been
given the space to adapt and to keep pace with changing social condi-
tions and values [because they were written down in legislation,
textbooks, and court decisions] without allowing for the dynamism of
customary law."'
' 69
The court drew on evidence presented by SALC and the Gender Re-
search Project at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies that these
163. Id. at para. 41 (internal citations omitted).
164. Id. at paras. 91-93.
165. Id. at para. 95.
166. Id. at paras. 75-76.
167. Id. at para. 80.
168. Id. at para. 45.
169. Id. at para 82.
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customary rules were no longer universally observed. 7° The Court em-
phasized that "official customary law as it exists in the text books and in
the [Black Administration] Act is generally a poor reflection, if not a
distortion of the true customary law. True customary law will be that
which recognizes and acknowledges the changes which continually take
place.""' In striking down the traditional rule of primogeniture enshrined
in the legislation, the court thus recognized that official, statutory cus-
tomary law was not necessarily a true reflection of what is often termed
"living" customary law, and that it was this official version that was in-
compatible with the Bill of Rights.
72
South Africa has grappled intensely with the interaction between
customary law and international human rights norms in the decade since
the adoption of its Constitution. These efforts are primarily a response to
the domestic internalization of the human rights norms enshrined in the
new legal order of South African constitutional democracy. Learned ob-
servers of customary law, like Justice Mokgoro, acknowledge that there
is much room for improvement in the practical daily integration of hu-
man rights norms into customary law in rural communities. However, the
work of the Chapter 9 institutions, legal advocates such as those involved
in Bhe, nonprofit organizations, sensitized individuals, and court deci-
sions have begun to change the customary law context in South Africa
through forms of societal internalization.
IX. CONCLUSION
Customary law in Sierra Leone and South Africa, especially that re-
lating to child custody, maintenance, and succession, is evolving to
incorporate more international human rights norms. South Africa clearly
has the advantages of more robust legal institutions, a more developed
nonprofit sector, including legal aid organizations, and a constitution that
enshrines human rights norms. It is not surprising, therefore, that court
decisions have been a prime vehicle for the internalization of women's
and children's rights in South African customary law.
While Sierra Leone does not enjoy the same momentum for change
in customary law that South Africa received from its Constitution, some
of the same factors-nonprofit organizations, sensitized individuals, and
legal advocates-have influenced Sierra Leonean customary law. Indeed,
the Timap paralegals' human rights and formal legal training and subse-
quent work in communities plays an important role in the process of
170. Id. at paras. 84-85.
171. Id. at para. 86.
172. Id.
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human rights norm internalization in rural Sierra Leone. Other trained
local actors, whether there are part of local nonprofit organizations, local
government, or international institutions, also play a part in internaliza-
tion. 171
For proponents of the internalization of international human rights
norms into customary law in rural Sierra Leone, the lack of codification
and precedent in customary law there represents an opportunity. By con-
trast, the South African system codified customary law, "rob[bing] it of
its inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the changing life of the
people it served, particularly of women.' 74 Sierra Leone customary law
can thus be influenced by human rights norms that are deemed accept-
able to the community, even if those norms have not been utilized in
prior customary law decisions. It is also important for advocates of
change to recognize that principles of international human rights norms
are already found within the customary system and to support those tra-
ditional principles of justice and alternative cultural institutions which
resonate with human rights norms, thus supporting natural evolution of
customary law.
Each time a paralegal in Sierra Leone inquires about what is best for
a child while mediating a dispute between families, or a sababu asks a
child for his opinion on a matter that concerns his future-like which
parent should exercise custody-the process of human rights norm inter-
nalization moves forward. The challenge for human rights advocates lies
in persuading those living under customary law of the desirability of
such human rights norms and illustrating how such norms coincide with
traditional principles of justice, rather than in imposing these norms and
potentially prompting a cultural backlash.
173. For example, in both Sierra Leone and South Africa, the respective Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commissions' hearings were played on the radio in local languages. Radio
programs have been a primary means of communication about human rights in both countries.
174. Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), at para. 90 (S. Afr.).
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